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ABSTRACT 
“Virtual” molecular compounds, created in molecular 
modeling software, are increasingly useful in the process of 
rational drug design. When a physical compound is patented, 
however, virtual use of the compound allows researchers to 
circumvent the protection granted to the patentee. To acquire 
protection from unauthorized use of compounds in their virtual 
form, patentees must directly claim the virtual compound. But 
Supreme Court decisions such as Bilski v. Kappos and Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. call into 
question whether virtual compound claims are patentable subject 
matter under § 101. Using the guidance offered by the Supreme 
Court and Federal Circuit, this Issue Brief argues that virtual 
compound claims are not abstract ideas and therefore, consistent 
with patent policy, qualify as patentable subject matter. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2000, the estimated cost of developing a new drug was $802 
million.1 More recent estimates suggest the sum is actually around $2 
billion.2 A large proportion of this cost involves identifying a substance that 
shows promise as a starting point for a new drug. This substance is 
identified in drug discovery as the lead compound.3  
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1 Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of 
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 
166 (2003). 
2 Neal Masia, The Cost of Developing a New Drug, in FOCUS ON: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 82, 82 (U.S. Dep’t of State ed., 2006), available at 
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/amgov/30145/publications-english/iprbook.pdf. 
3 AHINDRA NAG & BAISHAKHI DEY, COMPUTER-AIDED DRUG DESIGN AND 
DELIVERY SYSTEMS 4 (2011).  
26 CARBONS INTO BYTES [Vol. 12 
 
Following the discovery of the lead compound, the traditional 
method of drug design involves consistently altering the lead compound to 
identify a safe and potent compound worth the expense of clinical trials.4 
However, even after identifying a lead compound, the odds are still 1 in 
10,000 that drugs identified as “promising” will result in a commercialized 
product.5 In fact, the primary expenditure in drug design is failure.6  
The traditional method of drug design requires iterating through 
possibly thousands of compounds in the search for a commercially viable 
drug.7 This process is expensive in both labor and equipment.8 One study 
showed that this “discovery phase” incurs 68 percent of the actual cost for 
each drug placed on the market for consumers.9 Costs increase even more if 
a company has to license the lead compound from a patentee to perform 
experiments.10 
The use of computer-aided drug design employing computational 
chemistry reduces experimentation costs by eliminating the need for 
multiple, repetitive reactions.11 In the 1990s and early 2000s, the 
pharmaceutical industry believed that the possibility of generating virtual 
lead compounds entirely through computer simulation, known as de novo 
design, would revolutionize the industry.12 Unfortunately, limitations in 
                                                      
4 Id. 
5 RICHARD B. SILVERMAN, THE ORGANIC CHEMISTRY OF DRUG DESIGN AND DRUG 
ACTION 8 (2d ed. 2004). 
6 Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES, 
(Feb. 10, 2012, 7:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/ 
02/10/the-truly-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs/. 
7 NAG & DEY, supra note 3, at 2. 
8 Id. 
9 See id. While this study valued the total cost for each drug placed on the market 
for consumers lower than other estimates, it estimated that $156 million of the $231 
million cost for each drug placed on the market for consumers is in discovering the 
compound. 
10 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers 
to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”). But see 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e) (2012) (permitting, under the experimental-use exception, unauthorized 
uses for purposes “reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of 
drugs or veterinary biological products”) 
11 NAG & DEY, supra note 3, at 9; see also Bruce R. Gelin, Current Approaches in 
Computer-Aided Molecular Design, in COMPUTER-AIDED MOLECULAR DESIGN: 
APPLICATIONS IN AGROCHEMICALS, MATERIALS AND PHARMACEUTICALS 1, 5 
(Charles H. Reynolds et al. eds., 1995). 
12 NAG & DEY, supra note 3, at 9. 
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computing power limited the effectiveness of de novo design.13 Many in the 
industry deemed de novo design a failure.14  
Despite some of the historical failures and concerns surrounding 
computer-aided drug design, patent practitioners need be aware of the 
patent issues surrounding virtual compounds because of their current and 
possible future role in drug design. Rapid advances in computing power 
make it reasonably likely that in the future, de novo design will become a 
viable mode of drug design. And in the mean time, another technique 
utilizing virtual compounds, known as drug optimization, still makes 
virtual-compound patent concerns relevant.15  
Whereas de novo design begins the entire process from mere 
theoretical knowledge, drug optimization, like the traditional method, 
begins with a previously identified lead compound. The structure of that 
compound, bound with its receptor, is analyzed by x-ray crystallography.16 
The potency of the lead compound is then optimized by generating and 
predicting the binding of potential derivatives using mass screening and 
combinatorial chemistry.17 
Unlike the traditional method, however, drug optimization does not 
use the actual compound. Therefore, a company may not need to license the 
lead compound from the patentee for purposes of virtual experimentation. 
On the other hand, any claim directed to the compound in virtual form 
would likely come under § 101 scrutiny as to whether or not the claim is 
patentable subject matter, especially given the recent Supreme Court cases 
Bilski v. Kappos18 and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc.19 
This Issue Brief proceeds in two Parts. Part I addresses whether or 
not patents on lead compounds protect the patentee from unauthorized use 
of the compounds in virtual form. Part II analyzes the current law to 
determine whether virtual compound claims are patentable subject matter. A 
brief Conclusion follows. 
                                                      
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 9–10. 
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (holding that a patent application 
claiming a method for hedging losses by making investments in other segments of 
industry was invalid on the basis that the investment strategy was not patentable 
subject matter). 
19 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc, 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012) (holding that a patent application claiming a method for using the 
measurement of metabolites of an applied drug to decide whether to increase or 
decrease drug dosage was not patentable subject matter). 
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I. INFRINGEMENT 
Suppose Researcher A develops lead compound X in the laboratory 
and patents it. During the lifetime of that patent, Researcher B uses X under 
the traditional method to find the most promising alteration, drug Y. 
Assuming Researcher B has no license to use X, he has infringed Researcher 
A’s patent.20 
Now imagine that instead of using the traditional method of drug 
design, Researcher B used Researcher A’s patent to input the spatial 
coordinates of compound X into molecular modeling software. Using 
computer-aided drug design, Researcher B is quickly able to determine the 
reactivity of X with other compounds and simulates reactions of X until she 
finds the most promising alteration, drug Y. In this case, there is no 
infringement.  
Why the difference? The United States Patent Act provides that 
patent infringement occurs when anyone “without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . 
during the term of the patent therefor.”21 A court determines whether 
infringement has occurred using a “two-step analysis”: First, it construes the 
claim in question to determine its scope and meaning; and second, it 
compares the construed claim to the invention accused of infringement.22 
For a typical compound claim, a court would likely find that there is no 
infringement.23 
A. Prong One: Claim Construction 
The claim-construction prong of the test is specific to the actual 
claim being litigated. When construing claims, the court initially examines 
intrinsic evidence, such as the patent’s specification and prosecution 
history.24 In the absence of a novel meaning to a claim term, the court gives 
claim terms their ordinary meaning to one skilled in the art.25  
                                                      
20 See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that 
uses with “the slightest commercial implication” are disqualified from the common 
law experimental-use exception). 
21 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
22 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958, 964 (Fed Cir. 
2000). 
23 The patent infringement analysis would be similar even if the patent claimed the 
atomic coordinates of the compound instead of just the compound itself. See Ted L. 
Field, Comment, Computer-Aided Drug Design Using Patented Compounds: 
Infringement in Cyberspace?, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1001, 1018 (2001). 
24 Victronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582–84 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
25 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
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For purposes of this analysis, assume that the claim for the patented 
compound X reads, “A compound of [a given] formula . . . or a 
pharmaceutically acceptable salt, wherein [lists elements].”26 The words in 
play would be “compound” and “pharmaceutically acceptable salt,” though 
terms such as “composition” or “crystal” are often used as well. Here, 
assume there are no specific definitions in the intrinsic evidence for the 
terms “compound” or “pharmaceutically acceptable salt.” Accordingly, the 
court would refer to the ordinary meaning of the term “compound,” for 
example, “substances occurring naturally or produced artificially by the 
reaction of two or more ingredients.”27 Similarly, a court could define a 
“pharmaceutically acceptable salt” as “any salt derived from a 
pharmaceutically acceptable inorganic or organic acid or base.”28 
B. Prong Two: Comparison of the Claim to the Infringing Invention 
For an accused invention to infringe a patent claim, the fact-finder 
must find that it embodies “every limitation of the patent claim.”29 Assume 
that Researcher B created a virtual representation of the compound patented 
above. Researcher B did not make a “compound” or a “pharmaceutically 
acceptable salt” but instead made a representation of the compound using 
information disclosed by the patent. A patent on a compound protects only 
the actual compound and not a representation of that compound.30 
Therefore, the virtual compound does not embody every (or even any) 
element of the claim, making it likely that the factfinder would find that 
Researcher B did not directly infringe on the patented compound X. 
C. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents 
Researcher A might still argue that Researcher B’s use of the 
patented compound X in virtual form is infringing, under the doctrine of 
equivalents. This doctrine is based on the idea that “if two devices do the 
same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the 
                                                      
26 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,263,585, claim 1 (issued Sept. 11, 2012).  
27 E.g., Pharmacia Labs. Inc. v. U. S., 609 F.2d 491, 493 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1979) 
(providing the definition from the Tariff Schedules of the U.S. Annotated). 
28 E.g., U.S. Patent No 7,138,404 col. 3:56–58 (filed Nov. 21, 2006) (providing a 
definition for the term as used in this patent). 
29 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958, 964 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
30 In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963). Judge Rich wrote that “the 
graphic formulae [and] the chemical nomenclature . . . are symbols by which 
compounds can be identified, classified, and compared. But a formula is not a 
compound and while it may serve in a claim to identify what is being patented, as 
the meted and bounds of a deed identify a plot of land, the thing that is patented is 
not the formula but the compound identified by it.” Id. 
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same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form or 
shape.”31  
One of the generally accepted tests for equivalence—implementing 
this general principle—is the function-way-result test.32 Under this test, 
each element of the claim must be examined to determine whether the 
accused compound performs substantially the same function, in 
substantially the same way, and accomplishes substantially the same result 
as the claimed compound.33 The test of equivalence is applied to the 
“individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.”34  
There is at least a colorable argument that the computer 
representation embodies an equivalent of each element in the patent claim. 
The Federal Circuit has found that software implementations of similar 
functionality are equivalent: “[i]ndeed, we have upheld determinations of 
equivalence on the ground that hardware and software implementations of a 
component of an invention are interchangeable substitutes.”35 According to 
this argument, each virtual atom does the same thing as the physical atoms 
of the physical compound by interacting with virtual atoms of candidate 
drug molecules. Each virtual atom interacts the same way according to 
known laws of chemistry and physics, and each virtual atom achieves the 
same result by helping determine how candidate drug molecules will react 
with the patented compound.36 
Another test for equivalence is the “insubstantial differences” test, 
which asks if there was “only an insubstantial change” in the element.37 
Under this test, Researcher A could argue that the difference between the 
actual patented compound and the virtual compound is insubstantial, given 
that the atoms are positioned in the same position relative to each other in 
both, and that the virtual compound’s use is practically identical to the 
patented compound’s use. Likewise, A might argue that the difference 
relates to the form, rather than the function, of the compound, because 
whether or not the compound is virtual or physical, it contains the same 
                                                      
31 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). 
32 See id. This test is also known as the “triple identity test.” See, e.g., Roger 
Barrett, Discretionary Use of the Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Going 
Beyond the Triple Identity Test of Graver Tank, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 513 (1995). 
33 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.  
34 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). 
35 Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001).  
36 Field, supra note 23.  
37 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. 
Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). 
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spatial coordinates of atoms and they react in the exact same way.38 It 
would, after all, be unjust for the competitor to “exploit the . . . significant 
efforts and costs incurred by the patentee . . . in identifying, isolating, and 
effectively producing [the compound].”39 
Despite these arguments, a court would likely not find equivalence 
between the use of computer representations of atoms and the patented 
compound itself.40 A court would almost certainly reject equivalence under 
the function-way-result test given that the arrangement and interaction of 
elements in the virtual compound do not follow the laws of chemistry and 
physics like the arrangement of elements in the real patented compound.41 
Instead, they interact according to a pre-programmed mathematical 
algorithm that simulates those laws using today’s imperfect models.42 
Similarly, a court using the insubstantial-differences test would reject 
equivalence because of the fundamental difference between the composition 
of actual and virtual compounds. The claims at issue here require actual 
compounds composed of actual atoms. The virtual representations of the 
patented compound are fundamentally different from the physical 
compound itself—the latter actually reacts and is composed of the specific 
atoms, whereas the former is merely a software representation that reacts 
with other software representations. 
II. THE VIRTUAL FORM OF A CHEMICAL COMPOUND UNDER § 101 
Given that a patent does not protect a compound from the use of its 
spatial coordinates in a computer system, it might seem obvious that the 
way to protect the compound from virtual use is to patent the virtual 
compound itself. However, Bilski and other recent Federal Circuit and 
Supreme Court cases may call into question the patentability of such claims 
under § 101.  
Section 101 defines patentable subject matter to include 
“process[es], machine[s], manufacture[s], and composition[s] of matter.”43 
The text of § 101 also states that a claim falling into “any” one of these 
categories satisfies the subject-matter requirement.44 The USPTO’s 
guidelines elaborate on these criteria: A claimed invention “(1) must be 
                                                      
38 See Trevor J. Smedley & Ross A. Dannenberg, Enforceability of Machine 
Patents in Virtual Worlds, 13 J. INTERNET L. 1, 16–17 (2010) (arguing that in a 
virtual world a virtual mousetrap is equivalent to a real one).  
39 Jeffrey P. Kushan, Comment, Protein Patents and the Doctrine of Equivalents: 
Limits on the Expansion of Patent Rights, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 109, 111 (1991).  
40 See Field, supra note 23, at 1018. 
41 See NAG & DEY, supra note 3, at 9. 
42 Id. 
43 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
44 Id. 
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directed to one of the four statutory categories, and (2) must not be wholly 
directed to subject matter encompassing a judicially recognized 
exception.”45 These judicial exceptions include abstract ideas, physical 
phenomena, and laws of nature.46 Therefore, to determine the patentability 
of virtual compounds, a court must determine first, which of the statutory 
categories they fall within, and second, whether claims directed to virtual 
compounds are abstract ideas.  
Virtual compound claims can be phrased to fit in many of the 
statutory categories; frequently, they are phrased as process claims.47 It can 
be more difficult to determine whether such a claim is directed to an 
abstract idea,48 but the Supreme Court’s application of the “inventive 
concept” test in Prometheus provides some guidance.49 When a claim 
applies a law of nature or an abstract idea “to a known structure or 
process,”50 the Court has insisted that it “contain other elements or a 
combination of elements . . . sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice 
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”51 
When a claim contains such additional elements, they constitute an 
“inventive step” that makes it patent-eligible.52  
A. Computer-Implemented Claims and Abstract Ideas 
Virtual compounds are by nature intangible and exist only in a 
digital environment. Seemingly the epitome of an “abstract” idea, the only 
thing concrete or real about a virtual compound is the computer running the 
simulation and the projected image on the screen. While computer programs 
                                                      
45 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (8th ed., 9th rev. Aug. 2012) [hereinafter 
MPEP]. 
46 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).  
47 For an example of a process claim, see infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
48 Even the Federal Circuit has difficulty applying the Supreme Court’s standards in 
this determination. For examples of the Supreme Court recently vacating or 
reversing Federal Circuit decisions, see Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. 
Ct. 2431 (2012), granting cert., vacating and remanding Ultramercial, LLC v. 
Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 
3225 (2010). 
49 Prometheus, 132. S. Ct. at 1294. 
50 Id. (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187). 
51 Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230). 
52 Id. 
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per se are abstract and non-patentable,53 many computer-implemented 
processes have been found to be patentable subject matter.54  
To determine whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, the 
Federal Circuit created the machine-or-transformation test, under which “[a] 
claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into 
a different state or thing.”55  The Supreme Court has held that the “machine-
or-transformation test” is an “important clue”—though not dispositive—to 
the patentability of a process.56 Using this test, the question for many 
inventions has become: “[I]s a general-purpose computer a ‘specific 
machine’”?57  
A general-purpose computer can qualify as a specific machine 
under the machine-or-transformation test. However, the connection to the 
physical world provided by the computer is not enough, by itself, to 
transform an abstract concept into patentable subject matter.58 Instead, the 
addition of a machine must “impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a 
claim,” and “play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be 
performed.”59 In the 1994 case In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit held that a 
general-purpose computer turns into a specially programmed computer once 
programmed with specific software.60 Therefore, specially programmed 
computers impose a meaningful limit on the claim and likely satisfy the 
machine prong of the test.61  
Alternatively, to pass the transformation prong of the machine-or-
transformation test, the process must transform an article into a different 
state.62 Often, the courts look to see whether the process can be performed 
mentally.63 In Gottschalk v. Benson, for example, the Supreme Court found 
that a method of programming a general-purpose computer to convert 
binary-coded numbers into pure binary through a mathematical algorithm 
                                                      
53 See MPEP § 2106; see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972). 
54 See, e.g., Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
55 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
56 Bilski v. Kappos 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227, 3235 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. 
at 3258 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
57 Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1323 (2011). 
58 Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
59 SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
60 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
61 See id.  
62 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
63 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 71–72 (1972); CyberSource 
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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was not patent-eligible because the calculations could be performed 
mentally.64  
By contrast, in SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade 
Commission, the Federal Circuit found that a process was patentable 
because the calculations to determine the position of a GPS receiver could 
not be performed entirely by the human mind.65 Similarly, the Federal 
Circuit in Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. found that 
a method that manipulated computer data structures (like pixels of a digital 
image) and output a modified computer data structure was patentable 
subject matter.66 Since the human mind could not practically perform this 
entire function, the Federal Circuit found that the transformation of the 
computer data structures into a different data structure was not an abstract 
idea.67  
In the same vein and for the same purpose as the mental-process 
inquiry, courts look to see how integral a machine is to the performance of 
the claim. The process claimed in SiRF was patentable subject matter 
because it was impossible to generate ranges necessary to determine the 
position of the GPS receiver without the use of a GPS receiver.68 
Meanwhile, in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., the method of 
using the internet to verify credit card actions was found to be unpatentable 
because the function of the internet was unnecessary to achieve the claim’s 
objective.69 Instead of actually performing a transformation, the internet 
acted as a data collector.70 The Federal Circuit found this function 
insufficient to deem the internet necessary to the claim.71 
The breadth of a claim is an additional factor—expansive coverage 
weighs against the claim’s patentability because courts want to prevent 
claims “that too broadly preempt the use of a natural law.”72 The patent 
                                                      
64 Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. 
65 See SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
66 See Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
67 Id. 
68 SiRF, 601 F.3d at 1333. 
69 CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
72 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 
(2012).  
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system was intended to foster and not foreclose innovation.73 Since all 
inventions at some level utilize abstract ideas and natural law, innovation is 
“preempted” when a patent disproportionately ties up the use of underlying 
abstract ideas.74 The Supreme Court has “repeatedly emphasized . . . patent 
law [must] not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future 
use of laws of nature.”75 Because broader claims preempt more ideas than 
narrow claims, courts are more likely to find that they cover abstract ideas 
necessary for innovation.  
The patentability of computer-implemented processes is a hotly 
contested issue with little certainty as to what constitutes patentable subject 
matter. Hoping to clarify the governing law, the Federal Circuit granted a 
petition for rehearing en banc in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp., 
requesting briefing on the appropriate test to determine “whether a 
computer-implemented invention is a patent ineligible ‘abstract idea,’” and 
when, if ever, “the presence of a computer in a claim lend[s] patent 
eligibility to an otherwise patent-ineligible idea.”76 In Alice, the patent-in-
suit claimed a computer trading platform for exchanging obligations in 
which a trusted third party settled obligations between a first and second 
party so as to eliminate “settlement risk.”77  
Despite the Federal Circuit’s desire to bring consistency to the law, 
the Alice decision seemed to reflect the difficulty of the question of 
determining patentable subject matter. It contained “seven separate opinions 
reflecting at least three distinct approaches,” with no single opinion 
garnering more than five judges’ support.78 The plurality opinion in Alice 
determined that the method claim did not cover patent-eligible material 
because there was “nothing in the asserted method claims that represent[ed] 
‘significantly more’ than the underlying abstract idea for purposes of § 
101.”79 Judge Lourie, writing for the plurality, stated that “[u]nless the 
claims require a computer to perform operations that are not merely 
accelerated calculations, a computer does not itself confer patent 
                                                      
73 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (addressing the 
“constitutional command” that the patent system “must ‘promote the Progress of . . 
. useful Arts’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8)). 
74 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
75 Id. at 1301. 
76 CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 484 F. App’x 559, 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(granting request for rehearing en banc). 
77 CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1284–85 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
78 Bernard Chao, Interpreting CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Sept. 3, 
2013, 3:08 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/09/interpreting-cls-bank-
intl-v-alice.html.  
79 Alice, 717 F.3d at 1287. 
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eligibility.”80 Judge Rader, however, noted that “nothing” in the CLS 
Bank Int'l decision “beyond [the] judgment has the weight of precedent.”81  
B. The Effect of Federal Circuit and Supreme Court Decisions on 
Virtual Compounds 
For purposes of determining whether virtual compounds are 
patentable subject matter, it is helpful to analyze a sample claim. Since most 
of the claims contested in major § 101 decisions have been process claims, 
this analysis will utilize a sample process claim. However, patent eligibility 
does not depend merely on the form of the claim but instead on whether the 
claim’s “inventive concept” amounts to something significantly more than 
an abstract idea or natural law.82 Consider the following process claim from 
U.S. Patent No 6,083,711:  
1. A method of identifying a candidate inhibitor compound capable of 
binding to, and inhibiting the proteolytic activity of, an alpha, or beta 
herpes protease, said method comprising:   
a) introducing into a computer program information derived from 
atomic coordinate defining an active site conformation of a herpes 
protease molecule based upon three-dimensional structure 
determination comprising a catalytically active site formed by at least 
the interaction of three amino acids Serine, Histidine and Histidine, 
wherein said program utilizes or displays the three-dimensional 
structure thereof;   
b) generating a three dimensional representation of the active site 
cavity of said protease in said computer program;   
c) superimposing a model of the inhibitor test compound on the model 
of said active site of said protease;   
d) assessing whether said test compound model fits spatially into the 
active site of said protease . . . .83 
This claim can be broken down into simpler terms. The first step in the 
claim requires entering the virtual compound’s coordinates into a computer 
program. The second step utilizes the computer to transform the coordinates 
into a three-dimensional structure. The third step requires the computer to 
superimpose a model of the test compound onto the active site of the virtual 
compound. The fourth step requires an assessment of the fit of the two 
compounds.  
                                                      
80 Id. at 1286. 
81 Id. at 1292 n.1. 
82 See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
83 U.S. Patent No 6,083,711 cols. 61–66 l. 25–51 (filed May 9, 1997). The patentees 
claimed a method for using their previously patented herpes protease compound in 
computer-aided drug design of possible herpes protease inhibitors. 
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Upon first glance, the immediate concern about the claim is that it 
only mentions a computer program, without specific mention of a machine. 
However, this concern need not affect the analysis of the claim; patent 
eligibility does not “depend simply on the draftsman’s art.”84 Logically, the 
use of a computer program necessitates the use of a computer. While claims 
are not patentable simply because of computer implementation, they may be 
deserving of patent protection if they apply an abstract idea to a known 
structure or process in a way that demonstrates an “inventive concept.”85  
It remains to be determined whether this claim is directed to an 
abstract idea. One argument that it is might take the following form: The 
“inventive concept” is embodied in step four (part d) of the sample claim, 
which merely looks at two structures and inspects whether they fit. This is 
an abstract idea because the ability to determine fit is a mental process. The 
other two steps merely add a “generic computer function to facilitate 
performance” that is not enough to satisfy § 101.86 Accordingly, just like the 
claim in Alice, the sample claim’s use of a computer merely accelerates 
calculations.87 
However, this simplification fails to recognize two other inventive 
concepts: the virtualization of a specific man-made compound by its atomic 
coordinates, and the utilization of a computer to produce a three-
dimensional structure created from the coordinates. Step two of the claimed 
process involves the generation of a three-dimensional structure from 
atomic coordinates. It is infeasible for the human mind to superimpose a 
virtual test compound onto an active site of the virtual compound for 
purposes of determining its fit.88 Unlike the method claimed in Alice, a 
human could not feasibly perform the task. In fact, most computers have 
trouble performing the necessary calculations because “the computational 
resources required to obtain exact . . . solutions . . . on a conventional 
computer generally increase exponentially with the number of atoms 
                                                      
84 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 
(2012) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)). 
85 See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
86 CLS Bank Intern. v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
87 See id. 
88 See SCOTT E. UMBAUGH, COMPUTER IMAGING, DIGITAL ANALYSIS AND PROCESS 
5 (2005) (arguing that computer imaging is necessary when large database of data 
needs to be analyzed, because computer generated images enable humans to 
interpret this type of data). 
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involved.”89 The computer provides “the entire detailed ‘solution,’ without 
which it would be impossible to achieve the invention’s purpose.”90  
The sample claim more closely resembles the claim from Research 
Corp. than the claim at issue in Benson and therefore should be patentable 
like the claim from Research Corp. In Benson, the claim covered a method 
of programming a general computer to convert binary-coded decimal 
numbers into pure binary through a mathematical algorithm.91 Although the 
conversion of code in Benson might appear superficially similar to the 
conversion of atomic coordinate data into a virtual three dimensional image, 
the Benson claim involved inputs and outputs of a similar form—numbers 
converted into numbers. On the other hand, the conversion in this claim 
involves a form change from coordinates to spatial representation. It is 
simply not plausible that a human could mentally construct the spatial 
representation of a compound using its atomic coordinates. 
While the machine-or-transformation test does not definitively 
prove the patentability of the sample claim,92 the process’s use of a 
computer supports the patentability of the claim. In Alappat, the Federal 
Circuit found that use of a specific program on a general-purpose computer 
makes the computer a specific machine.93 Here, the sample claim is tied to a 
“specific machine” because the process claimed requires entering spatial 
coordinates into a specific computer program.94 Any general computer 
lacking these specific programs would be incapable of performing the 
method.  
Generating a three-dimensional representation of a compound from 
atomic coordinates is nearly impossible without that computer program. No 
other medium could generate the representation of the two compounds in a 
way that accurately could represent the compounds. Even with a computer, 
accurate portrayal of the compound is limited;95 without the computer, 
                                                      
89 B.P. Lanyon, et. al., Towards Quantum Chemistry on a Quantum Computer, 2 
NATURE CHEMISTRY 106, 106 (2010), available at http://arxiv.org/pdf/ 
0905.0887.pdf. 
90 See CLS Bank Intern. v. Alice, 717 F.3d 1269, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
91 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
92 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (“This Court’s precedents 
establish that the machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, an 
investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes 
under § 101. The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for deciding 
whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”). 
93 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
94 U.S. Patent No 6,083,711 cols. 61–66 l. 25–51 (filed May 9, 1997).  
95 See NAG & DEY, supra note 3, at 9 (observing that a lack of computing power 
has limited the use of computer-aided drug design). 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 39  
effective portrayal would be impossible. The entire purpose of the claim is 
to use computer evaluation systems to quickly, easily, and cheaply examine 
compound inhibition of the virtual compound.96 This purpose is thwarted 
without the use of the programmed computer. Just as the GPS receiver in 
SiRF was necessary to generate ranges to fulfill the goal of the claim,97 the 
computer in the sample process is necessary to generate the three-
dimensional structure required to fulfill the claim’s purpose. 
The narrow nature of the sample claim also favors patentability.98 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against upholding patents that 
too broadly preempt a natural law. Virtual compound claims written like the 
sample claim preempt practically no natural law given the very limited use 
of one virtual compound in a computer system for purposes of computer-
aided drug design. The sample claim would fail to preempt even an 
identical claim using different atomic coordinates because not “every 
limitation of the patent claim” would be identical.99 
C. Patentability of Virtual Compounds and Patent Policy 
By protecting virtual compounds, the patent system achieves its 
economic objectives.100 The patent system prevents the inventor’s 
compound from being used without authorization. As a result of the 
patentability of virtual compounds, the patent system entitles the inventor to 
a reward for her investment and sacrifice in developing the compound and 
ensures that others do not piggy back on that investment. Inventors are 
incentivized to continue developing drugs because the patent system gives 
them a monopoly over the compound in both physical and virtual form.  
The patentability of virtual compounds also promotes the disclosure 
objective of the patent system. A researcher who discovered a promising 
target compound might refuse to reveal its formula, instead relying on trade 
secret law, if patent protection did not extend to cyberspace.101 However, 
                                                      
96 U.S. Patent No 6,083,711 col. 26:61–65 (filed May 9, 1997) (“[U]sing these 
computer evaluation systems, a large number of compounds may be quickly and 
easily examined and expensive and lengthy biochemical testing avoided. Moreover, 
the need for actual synthesis of many compounds is effectively eliminated.”).  
97 See SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
98 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 
(2012) (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–120 (1854)). 
99 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958, 964 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
100 See Field, supra note 23, at 1019–23 (discussing the underlying policies of 
patent law and how cyberspace protection of chemical compounds suits them). 
101 Admittedly, the value of today’s pharmaceutical patents makes it unlikely that a 
researcher would refuse to patent the compound even if lacking virtual compound 
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with appropriate coverage in both concrete and virtual form, the researcher 
will be able to disclose the invention without losing his exclusive rights 
granted by the patent system.  
CONCLUSION 
Under current patent law, a patented compound would not be 
infringed by the use of the same compound in virtual form. However, 
specifically claiming the compound in virtual form would ensure protection 
from virtual infringement and would pass the § 101 inquiry due to the 
integral nature of the computer, the impossibility of executing the process 
mentally, and the narrow nature of a virtual compound claim. The 
patentability of virtual compounds achieves fairness for the inventor and the 
public in accordance with patent policy objectives. 
                                                                                                                         
protection. However, without virtual compound protection, future advances in 
computer technology may decrease researcher’s desire to disclose for a patent of 
the compound in physical form due the possible ease of using the compound in 
virtual form to create more effective drugs. 
